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ABSTRACT

The advent of modern high-precision guided airborne weapons has increased the
need for extremely reliable bomb fuzing systems. An electro-mechanical bomb
fuzing system is currently used in U.S. Navy and Air Force General Purpose
bomb based-weapons to include Joint Direct Attack Munition and Laser Guided
Bombs. The demonstrated reliability of that fuzing system in combat operations
on average has been less than perfect.

The operational commanders have

expressed that this is unacceptable since any dud results in coalition forces being
held at additional risk because a duded bomb could be utilized as an Improvised
Explosive Device by enemy forces. Just as the Precision Guided Munitions
transformed operational users’ mindset of one weapon, one kill, this same
transformation has led to the expectation for greater reliability for the bomb
fuzing system.

It is the purpose of this thesis to describe and discuss a

conceptual airborne bomb fuzing system intended to improve the reliability of
airborne weapon delivery sufficiently to meet the newly-established operational
requirements.
This thesis will cover the components and reliability of the current bomb fuzing
system, substantiate the requirement for a more reliable fuze system as a result of
the precision strike revolution, and an approach to meet that requirement while
balancing safety and reliability. The fuzing system concepts discussed are ones
iii

resulting from an effort performed as part of the High Reliability Fuzing System
Study for the Precision Strike Weapons Program Office based at Naval Air
Station Patuxent River, Maryland. The study is an ongoing effort conducted by
the In-Service Fuzing Systems Team, for which the author is Chief Engineer.
Concepts to which the author has made significant personal contributions include
an approach on how a certain sequence of events while time windowed will
satisfy the safety requirement that a fuzing system design possesses an
independent detection of the intent to launch and the post launch environments.
The thesis also contains the author’s analysis of how the proposed concept will
enhance mission accomplishment and increase overall reliability through the
simplification of the system buildup, the elimination of points of failures inherent
in the external components of the current system, and the system’s ability to
produce failure feedback. Since in the mind of the operational user that reliability
is measured at the target, the failure feedback from the proposed system will be
the main contributor to increasing reliability for the system and improving overall
mission accomplishment by preventing a dud from occurring.
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PREFACE

A portion of the information contained within this thesis was obtained during a
Naval Air Systems Command sponsored program. References to existing fuze
systems and the high reliability fuze concepts were obtained during an Analysis of
Alternatives study conducted at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division
based at China Lake, California for the Precision Strike Weapons Program Office
based at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. The research, results and
conclusions, and recommendations presented are the opinion of the author and
should not be construed as an official position of the United States Department
of Defense, the United States Navy, the Naval Air Systems Command or Naval
Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS

Armed. A fuze is considered armed when any firing stimulus can produce fuze
function.
Arming delay or arm time. The time elapsed, or distance traveled by the
munition, from launch to arming.
Booster and lead explosives. Booster and lead explosives are compounds or
formulations which are used to transmit and augment the detonation reaction.
Dud. A munition which has failed to function, although functioning was
intended.
Early Burst. A weapon detonating after completion of the arming delay but
before hitting the intended target.
Enabling. The act of removing or activating one or more safety features
designed to prevent arming, thus permitting arming to occur subsequently.
Environment. A specific physical condition to which the fuze may be exposed.
Combinations of environments that can be reasonably expected to occur must
also be considered within the context of credible environments.
Explosive ordnance disposal. The detection, identification, field evaluation,
rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of hazardous unexploded explosive
ordnance.
Explosive train. The detonation or deflagration train (i.e., transfer mechanism),
beginning with the first explosive element (e.g., primer, detonator) and
terminating in the main charge (e.g., munition functional mechanism, high
explosive, pyrotechnic compound).
Function. A fuze “functions” when it produces an output capable of initiating a
train of fire or detonation in an associated munition.
Fuze (Fuzing System). A physical system designed to respond to one or more
prescribed conditions, such as elapsed time, pressure, or command, and initiate a
train of fire or detonation in a munition. Safety and arming are primary roles
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performed by a fuze to preclude ignition of the munition before the desired
position or time.
Initiator. A device capable of directly causing functioning of the fuze explosive
train.
Interrupted explosive train (out of line). An explosive train in which the
explosive path between the primary explosives and the lead and booster
(secondary) explosives is functionally separated until arming.
Main charge. The explosive charge which is provided to accomplish the end
result in the munition; e.g., bursting a casing to produce blast and fragmentation.
These explosives, because of their relative insensitivity, ordinarily require
initiation by a booster explosive.
Premature function. A fuze function before completion of the arming delay.
Safe separation distance. The minimum distance between the delivery system
(or launcher) and the launched munition beyond which the hazards to the
delivery system and its personnel resulting from the functioning of the munition
are acceptable.
Safety and arming device. A device that prevents fuze arming until an
acceptable set of conditions has been achieved and subsequently effects arming
and allows functioning.
(MIL-STD-1316E, 1998)
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
Several recent military campaigns have shown that precision strike warfare has
increased the expectations of individual free-fall weapons performance. In years
past, the engagement tactics ranged from multiple bombs on a single target to the
carpet bombing of area targets. With the development of Precision Guided
Munitions (PGM) and their demonstrated accuracy, tactics have changed so that
now, only one weapon is allocated to each target. Example strike mission briefs
are contained in appendix A. But, the underlying problem with regards to
reliability is that the fuzing system has not changed. The current inventory of
free-fall bomb fuzes was designed to be produced at a high rate and at the lowest
possible cost. In the arena where multiple warheads were dropped, target defeat
could be achieved with fuzing systems designed with a lower reliability
requirement compared to what is required in the guided missile world of “one
shot-one kill.” The capabilities of these new PGMs have allowed the evolution
of operational tactics that support the objective of mission success with the
philosophy of “one target-one bomb.” This has lead to the expectation of that
“one bomb” working properly with a degree of reliability that far exceeds the
original design requirements of the current stockpile of free-fall weapons. Also,
the cost of delivery platforms and weapon systems have increased and the
1

criticality of rapid resolution of campaigns place large demands on first strike
lethality of weapons. Finally, each bomb which fails to detonate must be cleared
by Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams before ground forces can
continue or worse it could become an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) for
the enemy because they just received “several hundred pounds of high explosive
in a convenient, natural fragment forming, steel container” (Clessas, 2005, p. 2).
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the concept of a more reliable fuze
system, the High Reliability (HiRel) Fuzing System, which attempts to achieve a
higher reliability for General Purpose (GP) bomb bodies as utilized in Precision
Guided Munitions (PGMs). The author’s analysis was based on information
attained during a U. S. Navy developmental test program, however all
conclusions and recommendations are independent of the test program. The
author’s role in this program was as chief engineer for U.S. Navy in-service fuze
programs.

The study revealed that there is a definite need, or operational

requirement, for increased reliability with the current inventory of the electrical
fuzing system. Operational users employing Precision Guided Munitions have
the expectation that GP bombs with current fuzes work 100% of the time and
plan and employ like they do. GP bombs do not function 100% of the time and
there is a need to increase the reliability of the current inventory of fuzes.

2

The study also revealed how a more reliable fuzing system enhances mission
accomplishment and produces a potential return on investments if a new fuzing
system is pursued.

An increase in reliability will improve overall mission

accomplishment by reducing passes over the target, increasing first time strike
success, and reducing Unexpended Ordnance (UXO) and Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs). Also, if the fuze had a means to communicate its status after a
Built In Test (BIT), the user would know not to employ the weapon because of
the known failure, further reducing the number of UXOs and IEDs.
The bomb fuze has an impressive demonstrated reliability by itself, but the
limiting factor is the overall bomb-fuze-aircraft system. Continued efforts to
increase the reliability of the electro-mechanical fuze alone are futile because of its
reliability dependency on the less reliable elements in series and the assembly of
those elements. Therefore, included in the author’s analysis are problems and
solutions identified to demonstrate that increased reliability is feasible with the
removal of unreliable components in the current system and the simplification of
buildup.

This thesis will illustrate the attributes of the HiRel system and

recommend a road ahead for developing and acquiring the HiRel fuze system.
Several fuzing system concepts were developed and evaluated while considering
weapon compatibility, safety constraints, technical risks, and cost during an
Analysis of Alternatives study conducted at the Naval Air Warfare Center,
Weapons Division (NAWCWD) at China Lake, California. Portions of this study
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were used by the author in developing this paper. The proposed approach within
this thesis was considered to adequately balance the technical risks and cost
within the bounds of the safety constraints.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study evaluated the potential replacement of the Fuze Munition Unit 139
(FMU-139) fuzing system as utilized on the FA-18 Hornet aircraft. This thesis
will briefly describe the current fuzing system components and their individual
reliability. A reliability summary will be included for the two employment modes
of the fuzing system: Pulse power (referred to as Navy mode) and Continuous
power utilizing a Fuze Related Unit (FZU) (referred to as Air Force mode). This
study did not evaluate any particular Strike Fighter Mission or employment
tactics. This study evaluated the potential use of the HiRel fuzing system as
utilized in the General Purpose bomb families to include Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM) and Laser Guided Bombs (LGB). This study evaluated two
proposed arming environments to validate compliance with safety requirements
delineated in Department of Defense Design Criteria Standard (MIL-STD)
1316E. A review of pertinent literature and military standards delineating safety
criteria for fuze design, coupled with the author’s extensive personal experience
as an FA-18 test pilot and chief engineer for U.S. Navy in-service fuze programs
were used as the basis of research.
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Chapter 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT BOMB FUZING SYSTEM
The current fuzing system is comprised of several components. Some of these
components are 30 years old with some of their specifications adding ten years
onto that. The system can be divided into two major subsystems, which are the
aircraft and the weapon. The FA-18 aircraft subsystems that affect weapon
release and reliability include: aircraft software, AWW-4 Fuze Function Control
Set (FFCS), aircraft wiring, connections, decoders, and bomb racks. The weapon
subsystems include: a MK-122 safety arming switch with M70 bomb cable
assembly or a FZU-48 bomb fuze initiator with a coil power cable, a FMU-139
Electro-mechanical fuze, a bomb tail section, and MK-3 arming wire. The fuzing
system is identical when used in “dumb” free-fall bombs and “smart” LGBs or
JDAMs because they are all based on legacy MK-80 series bomb bodies. The
major components of the fuzing system are shown in figure 1. The current U.S.
Navy FMU-139 electro-mechanical bomb fuze within the bomb fuzing system
receives power from either the aircraft Fuze Function and Control Set (FFCS) by
a pulse through the MK-122 arming switch and M70 cable assembly or
continuously from a FZU-48 air turbine. The fuze does not receive power until
the bomb is separated from the aircraft for both bomb fuzing configurations.
Only Navy aircraft have an FFCS and so this mode is sometimes referred to as
5

Figure 1
Major Components of the Fuzing System
Source: Mr. Gary Evans, U.S. Navy

“Navy mode.” The Air Force were first to utilize the air turbine to power their
fuzes and not until 2001 have Navy aircraft used the air turbine mode so this
mode is sometimes referred to as “Air Force mode.”
INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT DESCRIPTION
FMU-139 Series Electro-Mechanical Bomb Fuze
The FMU-139 Series consists of FMU-139A/B, FMU-139B/B, and FMU139C/B.

The FMU-139 was originally designed from 1978 to 1979.

The

research and development phase began in 1980 and the fuze was fielded in 1985.
Approximately 790,000 fuzes were produced from 1985 to 1992 (Ash, 2006).
6

The FMU-139A/B was reconfigured to FMU-139B/B when the booster material
was upgraded to an Insensitive Munition (IM) material.

The most recent

modification and fuze currently entering production, FMU-139C/B Fuze,
provides 4 minute fuze operation for high altitude, long time of fall application,
compared to the FMU-139B/B which has only 60 second fuze operation. The
fuzes, hereafter referred to as the FMU-139, are Joint-Service (Navy/Air Force)
fuzes with multiple settings and can be employed in a high-drag (retarded) or lowdrag (unretarded) delivery as shown in figure 2. The FMU-139 Fuze is an
electronic impact or impact delay fuzing system.

It is a solid state,

microcomputer, tail or nose fuze used in MK-80 Series General Purpose bombs,
including LGBs and JDAMs. The major physical differences from other Navy

Figure 2
Delivery Profiles for High and Low Drag
Source: Mr. Wayne Steege, Alliant Techsystems
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Figure 3
Faceplate of the FMU-139B/B
Source: Precision Strike Weapons Bomb Systems Commodities

electrical fuzes are that the gag rod and arming wire housing are located in the
center of the faceplate and the fuze is secured in the tail-fuze well of the bomb by
a separate closure ring, which is screwed into the fuze well. The faceplate, as seen
in figure 3, contains a low-drag arm time rotary switch, a high-drag arm/delay
rotary switch and a 2.0/instantaneous (INST) interlock button.
The fuze has two basic operational modes and it evaluates the type of power to
determine the mode. One mode is the pulse power employment mode, referred
to as Fuze Function Control Set (FFCS) power or Navy mode. The other mode
is the continuous power employment mode, referred to as Fuze Initiator (FZU)
power mode or Air Force mode.

These two operating modes, which are

summarized in figure 4, are described in detail below.
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FMU-139
Release

FZU Power

Low Drag Set @
X

FFCS Power

Low Drag Set @
4, 6, 7, 10, 14, 20

Impact
-195, +195

Impact
-300, +300

Dud
High Drag
High Drag

Low Drag
-195

Arm
Time

Delay
Time

High Drag
Setting
2.0, 2.6,
4.0, 5.0 Sec

High Drag

Low Drag

Low Drag

Low Drag
Setting
4, 6, 7, 10, 14, or
20 Sec

2.6

5.5

+195

10

-300

2.6

5.5

+300

10

Seconds

Delay time is as selected on the High Drag – Arm Delay Switch

Instantaneous

Figure 4
FMU-139 Arm and Delay Flow Chart
Source: Mr. Tom Strickland, U.S. Navy

During the FFCS power mode, the fuze receives a voltage pulse from the aircraft
via the MK-122 Safety Arming Switch and M70 Series cable. The arming times
for this mode are in-flight selectable and determined by the voltage’s polarity.
The fuze incorporates three arming times (2.6, 5.5, and 10.0 seconds) when used
with FFCS which requires the low-drag arm time switch in the X position. When
the voltage is positive the arm time is 10 seconds and when it is negative the arm
time is 5.5 seconds. But, if a high drag environment is sensed by the fuze, then
the fuze overrides the 5.5 or 10 second command with a 2.6 second arm time.
The functioning delay (high-drag arm/delay switch) must be set during weapon
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assembly and turned on or off by the voltage’s amplitude during the FFCS mode.
If the FFCS voltage is 195 volts, then the fuze reads and stores the function delay
value of the high-drag arm/delay switch. If the voltage is 300 volts, then the fuze
ignores the delay value and functions instantly on impact. The FMU-139 has
three functioning delays (10, 25, 60 milliseconds). The fuzing options for FFCS
mode are summarized in table 1.
During the FZU or continuous power mode, the fuze is continuously powered
by the FZU-48 air turbine and the fuze verifies the switches have valid low and
high drag times selected. Valid time combinations for the fuze are when low drag
arm time is greater than the high drag arm time. If they are both valid, the fuze
stores the low and high drag arm times and the function delay value. The X
position for the FZU mode is read as a command to remain safe (functionally –
dud).
Table 1
Fuzing Options for FMU-139 in FFCS Mode
Cockpit Options
OFF

Arm Time Sec 1
-

Voltage
0 v DC

INST

10 Sec

+300 v DC

INST

5.5 Sec

-300 v DC

DLY1

10 Sec

+195 v DC

DLY1

5.5 Sec

-195 v DC

Note: 1 Arm time is overridden to 2.6 seconds if high drag sensed
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Delay Description
dud
Instantaneous at
impact
Instantaneous at
impact
Preflight selected
delay after impact
Preflight selected
delay after impact

There are two Electro-Explosive Devices (EED) that arm the fuze by aligning
the detonator with the lead booster. There is no power supplied to either EED
until just before the programmed arm time. The first EED is the Piston Actuator
and it receives power and fires 100 milliseconds (ms) before arm time to unlock
the rotor. The fuze verifies this happens before it applies power to the second
EED the Bellows Motor. The Bellows Motor fires about 30 ms before arm time
to turn the rotor and put the detonator in-line with the booster. After this
mechanical arm position is sensed, the fuze loads the stored function delay into
the detonator fire circuit and applies power to it. When either a proximity fire
command or an impact is sensed, the fuze waits for the delay time to elapse and
then fires the detonator. The detonator sets off the booster material which in
turns sets off the main weapon charge. (Strickland, 2004)
The FMU-139 Fuze is designed for maximum safety in handling and delivery and
has been tested Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO)safe. Significant safety features as delineated in the performance specification
(PMA201-03-003, 2004) are as follows:
a. The gag rod physically locks the fuze rotor in the safe position, keeping
the rotor from moving. The leads to the detonator are shorted together
until the fuze has armed.
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b. Red and black striping is marked on the gag rod/sleeve. This striping
makes unsafe positioning of the gag rod immediately visible.
c. If a charging voltage is applied to the fuze for more than 500
milliseconds, the fuze automatically duds. This ensures safety during a
hung store.
d. The fuze automatically duds if impact occurs between 1.8 seconds after
release and arming. This safeguards the delivery aircraft from detonations
caused by bomb to bomb collisions.
e. The impact and proximity sensors are discontinued for 80 milliseconds
after arming. This prevents the fuze from functioning (detonating the
bomb) on any spurious electrical signals or mechanical vibrations
generated during arming.
f. Arming time for FFCS mode does not begin until the aircraft release
circuit indicates that the MK-122 power cable has disconnected from the
bomb rack and weapon has dropped 6 inches from the aircraft.
g. Two Trans Voltage Suppressors (TVSs) are incorporated to reduce
Electro-Static Discharge (ESD) vulnerability.

12

AWW-4 Fuze Function and Control Set (FFCS)
The AWW-4 FFCS provides electrical fuzing power to the fuze via the MK-122
Safety Arming Switch and the M70 Series cable as described above. During the
three years prior to a systems engineering investigation in 1999 conducted by
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), the AAW-4’s past performance record
in the FA-18 of over 2000 flight hours per maintenance action exceeded its
specified Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of 1000 hours. (Evans, 1999).
The AAW-4 FFCS power output is specified at 500 ma, which is powerful
enough to provide an arming signal to several weapons simultaneously. The FA18 does not currently perform a BIT to verify the AWW-4 FFCS is functioning
properly. This has the potential to allow an electrically fuzed bomb to be released
unarmed if an unknown malfunction is present.
MK-122 Safety Arming Switch
The MK-122 Safety Arming Switch, as shown in figure 5, provides the interface
between the weapon and the aircraft armament power circuits during the Pulse
power employment mode, sometimes referred to as FFCS or Navy mode. It also
provides a positive Radiation Hazard (RAD-HAZ) barrier by blocking any signal
to the weapon. The MK-122 controls the available power connect time to charge
the fuze storage capacitor by the difference in length between the arming lanyard
and the co-axial cable. During release, MK-122 configured bombs receive power
from the aircraft FFCS after the MK-122 lanyard is pulled from the switch

13

Figure 5
MK-122 Safety Arming Switch
Source: Precision Strike Weapons Bomb Systems Commodities

closing the circuit to the fuze when the weapon falls 4 inches from the station.
At this point, the weapon is receiving fuze function power through the MK-122’s
coaxial cable, until the weapon has fallen to the end of this cable, which is then
pulled from its receptacle on the bomb rack (Precision Strike Weapons Bomb
Systems Commodities Guide, 2006).

Also, the MK-122 fuze safety switch

disconnects power from the fuze prior to the aircraft software removing power.
Current aircraft Operational Flight Programs (OFP) provide a longer power-on
time after pickle release to ensure the bomb will dud as expected via the internal
FMU-139 arming logic if the store hangs on the bomb rack (Evans, 1999).

14

M70 Series Cables
The M70 Series Cable Assemblies are the method used to transfer fuze power
from the aircraft to electric bomb fuzes to initiate the energetic explosive during
the Pulse power employment mode, sometimes referred to as FFCS or Navy
mode. There are three cable assemblies: M72, M73, and M74A. All are identical
except in length. The M72 is used on the 500 pounds (lbs) MK-82 Series bombs.
The M73 is used on the 1,000 lbs MK-83 Series bombs. The M74A is used on
the 2,000 lb MK-84 Series bombs. The M70 Series cables are installed during the
explosive filling process at the ammunition plant. When used in conjunction with
the MK-122 Safety Arming Switch, electric bomb fuzes receive pulse arming
power (±195 or ±300 v DC) directly from the delivery aircraft during the release
sequence. A M70 Series cable and MK-122 Safety Arming Switch are shown in
figure 6.

Figure 6
M70 Series Cable Assembly
Source: Precision Strike Weapons Bomb Systems Commodities
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FZU-48 Bomb Fuze Initiator
The U.S. Navy has traditionally powered the FMU-139 Series fuze with the
FFCS. After the advent of weapons with a longer time of fall like JDAM, the
Navy needed to use the FZU-48 Bomb Fuze Initiator. The FZU-48 is connected
to the FMU-139 Fuze with a power cable to operate longer than 60 seconds,
which is the current limitation of the FMU-139 A/B and B/B Fuzes. However,
the FMU-139C/B, once produced, eliminates the need to use the FZU-48
because this fuze provides 4 minutes of fuze operation with FFCS power. The
FZU-48 generates and supplies power to arm the fuze during the Continuous
power employment mode and is activated at release by the FZU-61 Lanyard.
With a FZU-48, the FZU-61 Lanyard is pulled as the weapon separates from the
aircraft pulling the ram air turbine into the air stream. With greater than 150
knots of air flow, the turbine generates the power required by the fuze. The
FZU-48 Bomb Fuze Initiator and power cable are shown in figure 7.

Figure 7
FMU-139 Fuze with FZU-48 Bomb Fuze Initiator and Power Cable
Source: Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division
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Aircraft Software
The Operational Flight Program (OFP) aircraft software is the overarching
operating system for the aircraft analogous to Windows® for a personal
computer. The OFP manages the controls and displays of the aircraft. Upon a
cockpit selection of an arm or delay time, the OFP communicates that to the fuze
through the FFCS with the use of voltage amplitude and polarity as described
above. Also, the OFP controls the solenoids that pull arming wires and lanyards.
Early aircraft software OFP 89A installed in older FA-18s contained an error that
could cause electrically fuzed bombs to dud. A fix was available to the fleet in
early 1995 that corrected this deficiency. All OFP loads subsequently undergo a
testing process to preclude an error similar to this from recurring. During the
systems engineering investigation in 1999, all software loads for the FA-18 were
verified in lab ground tests. No anomalies were identified and in all tests the
electrical fuzing signal provided was within specified limits and of a sufficient
duration and magnitude to fully arm the fuze. The analysis revealed that no
correlation existed between unknown dud bomb rates and aircraft software
changes. (Evans, 1999)
General Purpose (GP) Bombs
The design of low drag General Purpose (GP) bombs originated in the early
1950s. The bombs are identified as low drag by their streamlined cigar-shaped
body. Douglas Aircraft Company had designed the A4D Sky Hawk as the Navy’s
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light attack aircraft and one of the designers recognized the incompatibility of the
jet with the current “fat bomb” it was intended to carry. The bombs were a
source of considerable drag and aircraft combat radius or capacity could be
improved with the newer shapes. The A.O. Smith Corporation of Milwaukee
drew up the original production engineering drawings and was the first
production activity of GP bomb bodies. The armed services used specific bombs
for a specific mission such as armor piercing, semi-armor piercing, fragmentation,
or demolition. All of those bombs have been replaced by the GP bomb, but the
GP bomb is degraded compared with specific bombs in some of the specific
mission areas. There are four types of GP bombs and they are the 250 lbs MK81, the 500 lbs MK-82, the 1,000 lbs MK-83, and the 2,000 lbs MK-84. The
MK-81 has since been suspended and removed from service. Approximately
50% of the bomb weight is actual explosive. (Precision Strike Weapons Bomb
Systems Commodities Guide, 2006). These GP bombs are sometimes referred to
as MK-80 series GP bombs and an example of one is depicted in figure 8 with a
MK-122 installed. The external outlines of the MK-80 series bombs are similar,
and other than their diameter, length, and weight, they have similar
characteristics. They have a slender body made of steel with two fuze wells in the
forward and aft section of the bomb. Also, there are three smaller wells centrally
located on the top of the bomb body, two for suspension lugs and one for an
MK-122 Safety Arming Switch or an FZU-48 air turbine. Unguided free fall
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Figure 8
General Purpose Bomb with MK-122 Safety Switch
Source: Precision Strike Weapons Bomb Systems Commodities

bombs, LGBs, and JDAMs all utilize the MK-80 series GP bombs and the FMU139 electro-mechanical fuze with its associated components.
CURRENT BOMB FUZING SYSTEM BUILDUP
The General Purpose bomb fuzing system is one of many weapon systems that
both aircrew and ordnance technicians must be familiar with. The GP family of
bomb bodies is the basis for several weapons and they all contain very detailed
weapon assembly. “Current bomb fuzing performance is sensitive to the many
connections and level of attention afforded by ordnancemen and aircrew.”
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(Clessas, 2005, p. 12)

There are almost a hundred steps solely for the

components pertaining to the fuzing portion of the weapon as summarized in
appendix B. From start to finish, experienced ordnance crews can assembly an
individual weapon in about 20 minutes. It is common practice to establish an
assembly line like installation and buildup of several weapons whereby that same
experienced ordnance crew would take about 5 to 10 minutes per weapon
(McComb, 2006). The fuze design and mode of operation drives assembly. All
U.S. Navy GP bomb bodies come off the production line with the M70 Series
cable routed through the conduit. If operational requirements dictate the use of a
FZU-48 for time of fall purposes, the M70 series cable is removed and set aside
while the FZU’s power cable is routed through the bomb body. The weapon
could be flown on several missions in which the weapon was not expended and
then returned to be re-plumbed with the M70 cable for use with the MK-122
switch in the FFCS mode. Operational commitments and procedures have
turned the GP bomb fuzing system from a one time assembled system into a
multiple time assembled system subsequently degraded the components.
There are several critical steps in assembling a weapon. These steps are littered
with important warnings, cautions, and notes which directly equate to areas that if
not done correctly, the system will not operate properly. Any loose, poorly seated
connection or bent pins (figure 9) would lead to intermittent power or a power
transient for which the current FMU-139 has a known susceptibility to cause at
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Figure 9
Bent Pins on FZU-48 Bomb Fuze Initiator
Source: Author

best a dud at worse an early burst. The FZU-48 power cable has ongoing issues
with durability, ergonomics, and vibration. Recent early burst investigations have
suggested that the improper seating of the bayonet connector locking mechanism
of the power cable, shown in figure 10, is a possible source of failure. The
investigation concluded that it is extremely difficult to correctly make the
connection between the power cable and the fuze receptacle. Assembly crews
then use inappropriate tools on the delicate filter section, which is a known weak
point in the system (Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, 2005).
Also, incorrect setting of a faceplate switch or a lanyard not connected properly,
which are both not intuitively obvious, will result in the fuze not functioning
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Figure 10
FZU-48 Power Cable Connector and FMU-139 Fuze Receptacle
Source: Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division

properly. The current bomb fuzing system buildup is not foolproof with very
little room for error. The major drawback for the current bomb fuzing system
buildup is that there are no indicators of improper assembly or failed
components. The lack of feedback results in aircraft launching on a strike to only
find out when the weapon hits the ground and duds that something was wrong
with it.
HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF RELIABILITY FOR DIRECT
ATTACK WEAPONS
The fuzing systems for the U.S. Navy’s inventory of free-fall weapons based on
legacy MK-80 series bombs have significantly improved in the area of safety and
22

reliability over the past 30 years. The greatest contribution to an improvement
was the change from pure mechanical fuzing systems to electrically operated outof-line systems. An “out-of-line” system is a combination of an electrical and
mechanical system whereby the firing train physically has to get “in-line” to
detonate from its initial condition of “out-of-line.” The change to an electromechanical system provided both safety benefits and improved demonstrated
reliability from approximately 80% to over 90%. The electro-mechanical bomb
fuze receives power from either an internal capacitor charged by the aircraft or a
ram air turbine which opens after the bomb is separated from the aircraft. Even
though the fuze by itself has a relatively high demonstrated reliability, there is
degradation in the demonstrated reliability of the overall bomb/aircraft/fuze
system. Therefore, improvements to only the fuze will not correct the issue of
bomb dud problems.
The current fuzing system was designed and developed in the mid 1980s with
minor improvements through the 1990s. The smaller, more capable modern
electronics support development of a higher reliable bomb fuzing system. This
legacy fuzing system with its historically low reliability levels forced operators in
the fleet to consider dual fuzing with diversity, mechanical and electro-mechanical
and/or using multiple weapons to destroy a single target. The associated increase
in aircraft, aircrew, and weapon loadouts was not the optimum use of resources
and it was determined that dual fuzing slightly reduced reliability and warhead
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effectiveness against some targets. There was an incorrect fleet perception that
considered the electro-mechanical fuze to be the primary cause of the high dud
rates. The FA-18 was experiencing a failure rate of approximately 12% when
employing bombs with the FMU-139 electro-mechanical bomb fuze. This rate
was higher than in any other fleet aircraft at the time. A full system engineering
investigation of the elements that affect fuzing reliability for the U.S. Navy was
commissioned to identify the root cause of dud electro-mechanical fuzed bombs.
This investigation analyzed the electrical fuzing components, their specifications,
and operating histories. The engineering evaluation, completed by Mr. Gary
Evans in 1999, utilized six years of data from over 800 FMU-139 single fuzed
weapons release attempts showing an overall system reliability of 88% and
identified three categories of weapon failures: hardware malfunctions,
undetermined, and delivery errors. A known hardware malfunction was defined
as a malfunction that was identified by the aircraft systems or by post flight
maintenance. A known delivery error was defined as either improper aircrew
switchology or improper aircraft positioning for weapons employment.
Undetermined failures were those that had no identified cause to include
hardware and weapon failures. A summary of the overall system reliability and
system failure by cause is depicted in figure 11.
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Overall System
Reliability

Electrical Fuzing System
Failure Causes
as % of Failures

Known Hardware
Malf unct ions
Known Delivery

4.3%

Undet ermined

Undetermined
36%
(4.4%)

4.4%

Errors

Known Delivery
Errors
29%
(3.5%)

3.5%

Good
87.8%

Known Hardware
Malfunctions
35%
(4.3%)

Figure 11
1999 Engineering Evaluation Overall System Reliability and Failure by Cause
Source: Mr. Gary Evans, U.S. Navy

A further effort was initiated to determine the root cause(s) of arming failures.
This coordinated effort between the FA-18 Aircraft Program Office (PMA-265)
and the Precision Strike Munitions Program Office (PMA-201) was to develop a
systems approach for project planning and to gather additional data for known
hardware and undetermined failures.

A Conventional Ordnance Proficiency

Evaluation (COPE) team observed flight operations to gather additional data for
the categories of known hardware failures and delivery errors. The individual
component reliability below is a result of those efforts. A summary of the overall
system reliability and system failure by cause is depicted in figure 12.
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Overall System
Reliability
Known Hardware
Malfunction
5.4%

Electrical Fuzing System
Failure Causes
as % of Failures

Known Delivery
Error 0.0%
Known Delivery
Errors

Undetermined
1.6%

0%

Known Hardware

Undet ermined

Malf unct ions

33%

67%

Good
93.0%

Figure 12
2002 Performance Investigation Overall System Reliability and Failure by Cause
Source: Conventional Strike Weapons Program Office

The absence of delivery errors were attributed to the use of more experienced
pilots compared to the average fleet pilots used in the previous evaluation. Also,
personnel were aware that they were being observed. The cumulative total of
known hardware malfunctions and undetermined categories of 8.7% and 7%
respectively from the two evaluations were comparable.
Point papers by Mr. George Clessas and Mr. David Riggs in 2005 followed which
examined the feasibility of attaining greater reliability for general purpose bombs
which lead to an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to vet out concepts for a high
reliability fuzing system.
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CURRENT BOMB FUZING SYSTEM RELIABILITY SUMMARY
Theoretical Bomb Fuzing System Reliability
As described above, there are many components that are contained in the bomb
fuzing system.

Only the main components were included to calculate the

theoretical bomb fuzing system reliability and they are the FMU-139 Fuze, MK122 Safety Arming Switch used in conjunction with FFCS, and the FZU-48
Bomb Fuze Initiator. The performance specification reliability numbers for each
of these items were used to calculate the current mathematical reliability and they
were 95% for the FMU-139 Fuze, 98% for the MK-122 Safety Arming Switch
used in conjunction with FFCS, and 95% for the FZU-48 (PMA201-03-003,
2004). Therefore, the best case theoretical reliability the Department of the Navy
paid for removes the human factor by assuming perfect handling and installation
of the bomb fuzing system and flawless employment by aircrew. The theoretical
reliability is summarized for both operational modes in figure 13.

Human
Factor
.85 to 1.0

Human
Factor
.85 to 1.0

Fuze
Function
Control Set

MK-122
Switch

FMU-139
Fuze
0.95 (spec)

Reliability of Bomb Functioning
0.79 to 0.93

.98 (spec)
FMU-139
Fuze

FZU-48

0.95 (spec)

Reliability of Bomb Functioning
0.77 to 0.90

.95 (spec)

Figure 13
Theoretical Bomb Fuzing System Reliability
Source: Author
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Demonstrated Bomb Fuzing System Reliability
Unlike during the Electrical Fuzing System Performance Investigation where the
reliability of each component was researched, the fleet end user views weapon
system performance as a whole and their metrics are gathered with that in mind.
There are large variations observed in demonstrated fuzing system reliability. The
current system buildup procedure, as described above, require multiple steps with
no active feedback to the assembler to verify that connections are making
electrical contact and lanyards are adequately secured. Also, since the MK-122
Safety Arming Switch and the FZU-48 Bomb Fuze Initiator were designed as one
time use mechanical items, they cannot be tested prior to use in the field. The
largest variations in demonstrated bomb fuzing system reliability surface when a
new air wing recently arrives in theater. An air wing of tactical aircraft in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004 reported a dud rate of nearly 30%
immediately after arriving in theater. Operational commanders considering this
unsatisfactorily submitted a deficiency report to Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) to investigate and to correct the deficiency. In response to the
deficiency report, NAVAIR dispatched a Fleet Weapon Support Team (FWST)
to conduct an engineering investigation. No root cause was discovered but
installation and refresher weapon assembly training was conducted as well as the
ordnance crews were monitored. No further evidence was discovered but the air
wing had only a few more duds out of a couple hundred weapons after the
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FWST’s visit. Training and attention to detail appear to maximize the
performance of the system.
This pattern is very repeatable and air wings’ bomb fuzing system reliability
consistently drops upon arrival in theater. The next air wing in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom in theater in 2005 also struggled their first month of
deployment. One squadron within the air wing had a dud rate again of nearly
30% within the first month. The remainder of their tour though, they only had a
few more duds within hundreds of weapons being expended which increased the
overall reliability to near the specification value of the bomb fuzing system
reliability. The increased operations tempo and harsh desert environment are
probable causes to the consistent dip in reliability. As experience and lessons
learned are incorporated into weapon build up and employment, the dud rate
reduces to a rate less than 10%, which is near the design reliability limits of the
overall system. To maintain this lower dud rate, constant vigilance is required to
ensure connectors are kept clean, clear of defects like bent pins, and properly
secured.
Dual Fuzing
In an attempt to improve system reliability, one air wing, that had an extremely
high dud rate after first arriving in the theater of operations, proposed dual fuzing
as an option to improve the performance of LGBs in combat. The air wing
requested authorization even with strong opposition from their “engineering
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conscience,” NAVAIR, to dual fuze LGBs by installing a second FMU-139 into
the nose fuze well as shown in figure 14 (Denihan, 2006).

The air wing

misconstrued the primary cause of the dud rate to be a low reliability of the
FMU-139 revealing a misunderstanding of the system by the end user and the
reason for their inappropriate request for dual fuzing. At the same time of their
request, the FWST team arrived in country to examine the air wing’s processes
and determine if there was a hardware failure.

Subsequently, there was a

significant rise in reliability after the FWST arrival. But after dual fuzing was
authorized and incorporated into operations, the dud rate actually increased
slightly nearing the design reliability of the system (Denihan, 2006).

Figure 14
Dual Fuzed General Purpose Bomb
Source: Mr. Wayne Steege, Alliant Techsystems
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Ultimately, the reason for the increase dud rate after authorization of dual fuzing
is unknown, but there are some very strong hypotheses that could possibly
explain it. A second FMU-139 Fuze does nothing for the overall reliability of the
bomb fuzing system because the connection to the MK-122 or FZU-48,
depending on employment mode, is a single point failure. Therefore, any failure
with FFCS/MK-122, the FZU-48, or connections thereof would result in both
the nose and tail fuze duding. Also, the FMU-139 Fuze is one of the strongest
links in the fuze chain with a very high individual demonstrated reliability
(Conventional Strike Weapons Program Office, 2002). Additionally, the GP
bomb series is a blast fragmentation weapon and is not designed for use against
hardened targets. But when required, a GP bomb used against a hardened target
would utilize a steel nose plug in the nose fuze well to improve the penetration
characteristics. But, if a second FMU-139 Fuze is placed in the well during a dual
fuzing scenario, the nose fuze would be crushed on impact and there is an
increase in the likelihood of the bomb case breaking up rendering the entire
weapon useless. Therefore, it was concluded by the Precision Strike Weapons
Program Office that dual fuzing is authorized but not recommended because it
should not improve overall bomb fuzing system reliability (Denihan, 2006).
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SAFETY CONSTRAINTS
Safety Standards and Reviews
The purpose of the MIL-STD-1316, Department of Defense Design Criteria
Standard, Safety Criteria for Fuze Design, is to establish design safety criteria for
fuzes and Safety and Arming (S&A) devices that are subsystems of fuzes. Each
service has a safety review board that reviews the fuze’s design against the MILSTD-1316 be it an imbedded fuze in an air to air missile, a surface to surface
missile, an artillery shell, or an air to surface free fall weapon. The constraints of
the safety community delineated by the MIL-STD-1316 are all encompassing for
all these weapon systems and therefore in the effort to cover all circumstances,
vague or general requirements could result which may lead to misinterpretations.
The Department of Defense Fuze Engineering Standardization Working Group
(FESWG) the custodian of MIL-STD-1316, released the latest version, E, in an
attempt to reduce the ambiguities and clarify any misunderstandings. Also, the
advent and rapid advancement in solid state electronics has furnished alternatives
for fuze safety design where historically fuzes have utilized physical interrupted
explosive trains. New technology for explosive initiation elements has provided
an option for eliminating mechanical means of controlling the arming process.
The application of these technology advances is addressed in that revision as well.
The safety and arming requirements delineated in the MIL-STD-1316 are
mandatory fundamental elements of design, engineering, production, and
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procurement of fuzes. Any weapon system that is going to be fielded in the U.S.
Navy must be reviewed in its entirety by the Weapon System Explosives Safety
Review Board (WSESRB).

In turn, the design, engineering documentation,

production and procurement plans for the fuzing system must be reviewed by the
Fuze and Initiation Systems Technical Review Panel (FISTRP), the arm of the
WSESRB, which holds any fuzing system to the requirements of the MIL-STD1316. The FISTRP then recommends fleet release of the fuzing system to the
WSESRB, who in turn provides a safety concurrence for fleet release of the
weapon system.
Two Arming Environments Defined
Most of MIL-STD-1316 and quite a few other standards dealing with ElectroMagnetic Interference (EMI) and other environmental concerns that apply to a
fuzing system will become more pertinent once the design becomes more robust.
One of the greatest hurdles to meet within MIL-STD-1316 is the requirement of
two independent arming environments. With the intentions of limiting the scope
of this study, the main focus with regards to safety constraints on a fuzing system
for this study will revolve around meeting this requirement. This attribute of the
system is the most difficult and has the most impact on the overall design of the
system. Paragraph 4.2.1 of MIL-STD-1316E which describes the requirement of
two arming environment is displayed below:
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“Safety redundancy. The safety system of fuzes shall contain at least two
independent safety features, each of which shall prevent unintentional arming of
the fuze. The stimuli enabling a minimum of two safety features shall be derived
from different environments. Utilization in the fuze design of environments and
levels of environmental stimuli to which the fuze may be exposed prior to
initiation of the launch cycle shall be avoided. Operation of at least one of these
safety features shall depend on sensing an environment after first motion in the
launch cycle, or on sensing a post-launch environment. An action taken to initiate
launch may be considered an environment if the signal generated by the action
irreversibly commits the munition to complete the launch cycle.”
Events and signals can be combined to form arming environments. The first
arming environment can be pre-launch if it is part of the launch cycle and if it is
irreversible.

The only exception to irreversible is an actual failure of the

launching system prohibiting the weapon from being expended. Failures do
occur and therefore the requirement of having that second arming environment
to prevent completing of the arming cycle is beneficial. The second arming
environment is after first motion or post launch. The intent of the second
arming environment is to confirm that the weapon has launched and it should
indicate that the weapon is in actual flight.
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Two Arming Environments of Current Bomb Fuzing System
As described earlier, when power is applied to the fuze, it evaluates the type of
power to determine the operational mode, FFCS with pulse power or FZU-48
with continuous power. The fuze handles the arming environments differently
but with some similarities for these two operational modes. The first operational
mode’s arming environment that will be described is the pulse power mode with
the use of the FFCS. The name pulse power is some what of a misnomer
because the aircraft does not send a pulse of power through the system to the
fuze but rather a voltage is applied but seen by the fuze only for a short period of
time resulting in the two arming environments. Initially, a voltage of the correct
amplitude and polarity for arm and delay time is applied to the pylon of the
selected weapon stations when the weapon release button is depressed. Next, the
voltage is applied to the receptacle of the MK-122 Safety Arming Switch when
the hooks of the rack are open. Next, as the weapon falls away from the aircraft
the shorter lanyard of the MK-122 switch is pulled completing the circuit through
the MK-122 switch and applying the ±195 or ±300 volts to the FMU-139 Fuze’s
storage capacitor which establishes the first arming environment. Finally, as the
weapon continues to fall away from the aircraft and reaches the distance of the
coaxial cable on the MK-122 Safety Arming Switch, the coaxial cable disconnects
from the pylon and the voltage is therefore removed from the fuze. The removal
of the voltage is required within 500 ms establishing the second arming
environment. In summary, the two arming environments for the FMU-139 Fuze
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while operating in FFCS mode is the application of power then the removal of
power within 500 ms, i.e. a windowed power scenario. (Ash, Bartels, 2006).
Therefore, if a weapon is released with no application of power or if a weapon
has power applied and fails to separate from the aircraft, i.e. a hung store, the
fuze would fail safe or dud.
The FMU-139 Fuze’s other operating mode is continuous power utilizing the
FZU-48 Bomb Fuze Initiator. Unlike the other mode, the name continuous
power describes the mode exactly. The first step in the arming process for the
continuous power mode is, while the weapon is falling away from the aircraft, the
FZU-61 lanyard that is attached to the aircraft pylon pulls open the FZU-48
cover to introduce the ram air turbine into the air stream. The turbine generates
an AC signal that is sent through the power cable to the fuze. Initially, the
positive portion of the signal is received by the FMU-139 Fuze and the fuze
utilizes that power to initialize which establishes the first arming environment.
The negative portion of the signal is restricted until the cover of the FZU-48 is
completely opened.

In the process of the cover opening, a Field-Effect

Transistor (FET) enables the negative portion of the signal to pass to the fuze.
This negative portion is interpreted by the fuze as a release signal and that signal
is required to be received within 500 ms from the application of the positive
portion establishing the second arming environment. In summary, the two
arming environments for the FMU-139 Fuze while operating in continuous
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power mode is the application of the positive signal then the completion of the
signal or application of the negative portion within 200 ms, i.e. a windowed
power scenario again. (Ash, Bartels, 2006).
The FMU-139 Fuze while operating in pulse or continuous power modes was not
approved by the safety panels as a standalone unit. The FMU-139 Fuze required
the use of either the MK-122 Safety Arming Switch components or the FZU-48
Bomb Fuze Initiator components to receive the FISTRP’s recommendation for
approval.
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Chapter 3

HIGH RELIABILITY FUZE CONCEPT
ATTRIBUTES OF A SYSTEM THAT WILL YIELD HIGH
RELIABILITY
A revolutionary approach must be utilized to achieve a higher reliability for free
fall weapons employed by U.S. Navy tactical aircraft. In the past, the approach
was focused primarily on improving the reliability of the fuze itself or updating
the cables and components that make up the system. Any new bomb fuzing
system needs more than just improving the fuze or components but rather a
complete overhaul of the system. As described earlier, the safety architecture of
the bomb fuzing system requires the use of the MK-122 Safety Arming Switch or
the FZU-48 Bomb Fuze Initiator. While these components are required for the
fuzing system to be considered safe by the safety board, the components also
provide degradation to fuzing reliability. Also, the complexity and “no-room-forerror” buildup directly impacts the reliability as well. So with these things in
mind, the following design principles are required for a new bomb fuzing
concept: reduce or eliminate human factors, minimize the use of mechanical
elements, and possess the ability to perform fuzing system level tests (Clessas,
2005).
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Reduction or Elimination of Human Factors
As the number of steps to assembly a bomb fuzing system increases, so does the
probability of a mistake. “Every human step is an opportunity for an error which
increases the overall failure rate of the system” (Clessas, 2005, p. 4). A driving
design principle for a new bomb fuzing system should be a simplistic design from
the outside resulting in simplifying the buildup process. Assembly attributes need
to be “foolproof” to prevent poor connections and improper installation which
would reduce the failure rate of the overall system.
Minimize the Use of Mechanical Elements
There is a lower reliability inherent in mechanical components and the removal of
them would increase bomb fuzing system reliability. Mechanical elements and
mechanisms are susceptible to failure when subjected to harsh environments and
long time periods of storage.

U.S. Navy tactical aircraft operate in harsh

environments including the flight deck of an aircraft carrier to desert airstrips
exposing the bomb fuzing system to a wide range of environments. Some
examples of mechanical elements are the faceplate switches utilized to set arming
and delay functionality, internal retard switches utilized for high drag employment
mode, and bellows motor utilized to align the mechanical portion of the fuze
train for detonation. The removal of some of these elements would require a
paradigm shift in bomb fuzing system mentality.

The arming and delay

functionality would need to be passed via electronic message traffic described
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later in this paper. The removal of the retard switches would eliminate the high
drag employment mode capability from this system unless another means of
sensing a high drag environment was developed. If operational forces would
allow it, the “all in one” in the future fuze would be lost but reliability would be
gained. Ultimately, the small potted electronic components tend to survive
higher vibration and shock with less degradation over time than larger mechanical
elements. “Modern weapon guidance units with electrical part counts five times
that of a fuze have mean time between failures greater than a hundred hours,
which equates to a reliability of 0.999 for a time of flight of 5 minutes” (Clessas,
2005, p. 5).
Perform Fuzing System Level Tests
The first time aircrews know if the current bomb fuzing system is going to work
is when it hits the ground. A robust aircraft, weapon, and fuzing system interface
would allow the overall system to identify failures before the weapon is released.
Failures could occur any time in the bomb fuzing system life cycle. Therefore,
system level tests should be performed throughout that life cycle. Testing should
be performed before weapon assembly to ensure all the components are
operational after shipping and storage.

Testing should be completed after

weapon assembly to ensure connections are complete and assembled properly.
Testing should be performed while airborne prior to mission to allow a spare
aircraft to fill in if required to minimize a loss of a sortie. And finally, testing
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should be performed before weapon release to prevent a non-operational bomb
from hitting the ground resulting in a dud.

The Department of Defense

ultimately can not afford 100% inherent reliability, but a Built in Test (BIT) and
status monitoring could be just as effective. For example, if 100 bombs are
dropped and 5 dud, that is considered bad, but if 95 bombs are dropped with 0
duds that would be comparably good.

“If we can achieve 95% reliability

measured before the weapon is dropped but every weapon works 100% of the
time when viewed by the bad guys, this is a good thing” (Hole, 2006, p. 17). The
five would be brought back and would require downloading and disassembling,
but there would be no concern of IEDs or UXOs. In the end, reliability is
measured at the target.
WEAPON COMPATIBILITY
The primary weapons that would be in scope for the use of the HiRel Fuzing
System are based on the MK-80 Series General Purpose bombs and are MILSTD-1760 compatible weapons. The inventories of weapons that utilize or will
utilize the MIL-STD-1760 connection and are based on the MK-80 Series bombs
are the JDAM family of weapons and Dual Mode LGBs (DMLGBs). The
existing inventory of LGBs and unguided free fall bombs would be secondary
because they do not currently implement a 1760 connection but would require a
new designed, developed, and tested connector and harness. The new HiRel
Fuzing System would only require a single interface with the aircraft through the
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existing 1760 weapon interface or new 1760 connection and would eliminate the
need for ancillary components such as the MK-122 safety switch and FZU-48
therefore limiting the number of connections which will increase reliability and
simplify buildup. The HiRel Fuzing System will take advantage of the established
infrastructure and lessons learned of MIL-STD-1760 weapons.

The 1760

compatibility will supply power and the primary means of communication with
the fuzing system. The MIL-STD-1553 message traffic will transmit fuzing
options to include arm times and function delay times as well as release
environmental data such as valid aircraft velocity received through a transfer
alignment message.

Messages and commands are similar to those already

provided to interface weapons such as JDAM and Joint Stand Off Weapon
(JSOW). Any additional system as a terminal on the 1760 network will require an
extensive modification to the aircraft and weapon OFP software. To minimize
the impact of an OFP change, a fuzing system could monitor discrete signals on
the 1760 line from the aircraft to the weapon providing information to establish
the safety arming environments and then receive fuze data via a serial data
connection directly from the weapon’s mission computer. This approach would
require an additional connection but would be the lesser of two evils. The
moment a new system is a 1760 terminal on the aircraft, an extensive validation
and verification of the aircraft OFP would be required which would be cost
prohibitive for a new fuzing system (Ash, 2006).
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NOTIONAL FUZING SYSTEM
The HiRel Fuzing System’s design features should be focused around the very
reliable Electronic Safe & Arm Device (ESAD) technology.

Unlike its

predecessor the FMU-139 with electro-mechanical out of line attributes, the
HiRel would consist of a pure electronic fuze with an in-line explosive train.
There are other ESAD fuzes in the U.S. Navy weapons inventory like the
imbedded fuze in either the JSOW or the Air Intercept Missile (AIM)-9X
Sidewinder missiles so HiRel would not be the first ESAD the safety community
has seen. ESAD technology is a proven technology and should be the basis for
the HiRel Fuzing System. An S&A device that is purely electronic and uses logic
to function permits very standardized manufacturing and high automation. But
since there is no physical barrier like the rotor or gag rod, the HiRel Fuzing
System would require some kind of safety barrier to prevent unwanted
environmental stimuli from causing the fuzing system to initiate the weapon’s
explosive material. First, HiRel Fuzing System would utilize a very insensitive
munition as the explosive initiator and second incorporate a Low Energy
Exploding Foil Initiator (LEEFI) to set off that insensitive munition. Insensitive
munition technology has come along way in developing stable, plastic-bonded
material which becomes difficult to initiate under adverse conditions unlike the
sensitive Electro-Explosive Device (EED) in the FMU-139 Fuze. The key is
getting it to detonate only under specific proper initiation from the LEEFI. A
LEEFI is also somewhat of a electrical barrier designed to only accept extremely
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unique electrical signatures allowing it to withstand even a lightning strike without
causing the initiator to function. (Ash, 2006)
Some other basic design features that should be incorporated into the HiRel
Fuzing System are a serial data interface with the weapon’s Guidance Control
Unit (GCU) to pass commands or messages, the ability to meet the current
JDAM penetration requirements, and a pre-launch, in-flight, and pre-release
status monitoring or test ability (BIT). Also, the HiRel Fuzing System should
receive power first from the aircraft and then from the weapon system’s battery.
The fuzing system would receive aircraft power via the 1760 connection prior to
the weapon’s battery for communication, self tests and limited safety logic
functions. There should be no self test functions of safety locks allowed to
prevent any inadvertent occurrences of arming while testing the system (Cope,
2005). The weapon battery power would then be utilized for arming the system.
There must be in place a strong power partition between the aircraft and weapon
power to ensure that the fuze cannot arm under aircraft power. Finally, to meet
the two arming environments of MIL-STD-1316, the HiRel Fuzing System
should implement time window requirements, monitor the sequence of the
events, and validate those prescribed events to ensure the uniqueness of the
arming events. A notional block diagram of the HiRel Fuzing System is shown in
figure 15.
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Figure 15
Notional Block Diagram of the HiRel Fuzing System
Source: Author

Following is a notional launch sequence for the HiRel Fuzing System:
1. Upon aircraft power up and store initiation, fuzing system identifies itself
to weapon GCU and performs start-up BIT.
2. Fuze data, no-earlier-than-arm and detonation delay times, are transferred
from aircraft to fuze from cockpit selection or mission planning tool and
fuze sends status to weapon.
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3. After takeoff and every time the weapon is selected, the fuze performs
periodic BITs and sends status to the weapon.
4. Pilot maneuvers aircraft into the weapon launch envelope, selects master
arm, and presses the weapon release button.
5. Aircraft sets release consent signal and fuze receives it via the MIL-STD1760 connection. The fuze performs a final BIT as the weapon battery is
squibbed powering the weapon GCU and the fuzing system. The fuze
determines all conditions have been met in the correct sequence and
responds to the weapon which in turn sends a clear to release signal to
the aircraft.
6. Aircraft commands weapon rack to release the weapon and the weapon
proceeds to separate.
7. As the fuze is sensing the proper weapon ejection acceleration profile, the
umbilical disconnects within the correct time window and the safe
separation timers start.
8. The fuzing system receives time to go and position to independently
calculate time to go to validate free flight and then commands power to
the arming module of the fuze.
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9. The arming module charges the capacitors for firing the LEEFI at the
minimum time to impact if the safe separation timers have surpassed the
no-earlier-than-arm time.
10. Upon weapon impact and after programmed detonation delay if any, the
LEEFI is fired and the booster of the fuzing system detonates setting off
the weapon’s main charge.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS, CONSTRAINTS
The major design driver for any fuzing system while it is complying with MILSTD-1316 is the requirement of possessing two independent safety features
derived from different environments. The HiRel Fuzing System is required to
have an independent detection of the intent to launch and the post launch
environments. The events and signals in the operational sequence of a fuzing
system can be combined to form the arming environments. To recall, the first
arming environment can be pre-launch if the environment is part of the launch
cycle and if it is considered irreversible. “An action taken to initiate launch may
be considered an environment if the signal generated by the action irreversibly
commits the munition to complete the launch cycle” (MIL-STD-1316, Para.
4.2.1). The following events combined in the correct sequence and time windows
derive an irreversible intent to launch and the first arming environment as shown
in figure 16: release consent signal from the aircraft and power change over from
aircraft power to weapon battery power. The release consent signal is a high
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Figure 16
HiRel Fuzing System Arming Environment Timeline
Source: Author

integrity discrete signal generated by the aircraft when the aircrew presses the
weapon release button with the intent to release a weapon (Clessas, 2005). This
signal is passed via the 1760 connection and would require monitoring by the
fuzing system. The signal is also used by 1760 compatible weapons to initiate the
weapon release process such as initiating the weapon battery. So to fulfill the first
arming environment, the fuzing system monitors the power change over by first
checking the absence of weapon battery power while the aircraft powers the fuze
non-safety logic circuitry.

Then, the fuzing system detects the presence of

weapon battery power; the arming power source is now available. And, within a
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predetermined time period, the fuze senses the removal of aircraft power
completing the first arming environment. The release consent signal and the
squibbing of the weapon battery are irreversible satisfying the requirements of the
first environment defined in MIL-STD-1316. Also, the fuzing system should
have a safety feature whereby it duds if aircraft power is sensed after the fuzing
system senses the removal of that power.
Next, the second arming environment occurs after first motion or post-launch.
“Operation of at least one of these safety features shall depend on sensing an
environment after first motion in the launch cycle, or on sensing a post-launch
environment” (MIL-STD-1316, Para. 4.2.1). This event is to confirm that the
weapon has launched and should indicate that the weapon is actually in flight.
The following events combined in the correct sequence and time windows derive
the second arming environment as shown in figure 16: umbilical disconnect,
proper weapon ejection acceleration profile from the rack, and time to target
decreasing as determined by the fuzing system with data supplied by the weapon.
To determine umbilical disconnect, the fuzing system would monitor weapon
address lines of the MIL-STD-1760 connection to determine when the connector
is fully released. Currently, the JSOW monitors six address lines in the connector
to generate a signal for its fuzing system (Clessas, 2005).

The umbilical

disconnect must occur after power changeover therefore the weapon battery is
being used to power the fuze circuitry and the disconnect must occur within a
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specified timeframe.

Following the umbilical disconnect, the fuzing system

would sense the proper weapon ejection acceleration profile as the weapon is
being jettisoned from the rack also within a specified timeframe from umbilical
disconnect. An example weapon ejection acceleration profile of a 500 lbs JDAM
released from an aircraft is shown in figure 17. The fuzing system would have
imbedded accelerometers to sense the accurate profile.

The accelerometers

would be imbedded so that they are independent of the weapon system allowing
for one more barrier of safety. Since this fuzing system is needed for weapons
with varying weights, the heaviest class weapon will drive the profile limits. The
correct sequence of events and the specified timeframes are required to make these
occurrences unique in establishing the basis for the second arming environment.
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Figure 17
500 lbs JDAM Ejection Acceleration Profile
Source: JDAM Program Office
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As the weapon is guiding to the target, the fuzing system will then determine if it
is in actual flight with data supplied by the weapon thus completing the second
arming environment. For the fuze to retain the critical capability of safety, the
fuze must determine that the data supplied are valid and the arming conditions
have been met allowing the firing capacitor to be charged, putting the ESAD in
an armed status. To do this, the weapon’s mission computer could do one of
two things. The mission computer in the Guidance Control Unit (GCU) would
periodically pass, via the serial data interface, time-to-impact and the fuzing
system validates that the time is decreasing as well as compares the timing against
internal timers to ensure the time-to-impact characteristics are correct. This
requires a certain level of dependency of the fuzing system on the weapon’s
mission computer which might not be looked upon favorably by the safety
community. The other option is to have the fuzing system receive the weapon’s
raw data of position and allow the fuzing system to independently calculate the
time-to-impact which would reduce the dependency on the weapon’s mission
computer. Also, a combination of the two whereby the fuzing system receives
time-to-impact and positioning to calculate time-to-impact would be ideal for the
safety community for redundancy, independence, and verification but this
approach might not be achievable because of the computing power and
complexity required by the fuzing system.
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Finally, once the fuzing system has sensed the umbilical disconnect, proper
weapon ejection acceleration profile, and determines the weapon is approaching
the target, the second arming environment is achieved. Unlike the legacy fuzing
systems though, the HiRel Fuzing System should not use arm times counted
from a notional Time zero (T0) that is usually associated with the arming
environments but rather count backwards a prescribed minimum time from a
notional Time of impact (Ti). Since the HiRel Fuzing System would be utilized
only with smart weapons with a long time of fall and not high drag weapons,
there is no foreseeable reason to count a prescribed arm time from release. An
arm time from release complicates safe separation modeling when it is less than
20 seconds where most of the legacy systems operate. But, if most PGM’s time
of fall is greater than 60 seconds and the fuzing system did not arm until 2
seconds before impact as determined by the fuze, then this would minimize the
safety concern associated with safe separation. However, the fuzing system
should have a check to require it to not arm any less than a prescribed time limit
from release. This no-earlier-than arm time should be cockpit selectable and
passed via the serial data interface to allow the aircrew the greatest amount of
flexibility.
COST CONSIDERATIONS
The HiRel Fuzing System would be designed and manufactured more like current
guided missile fuze systems rather than legacy bomb fuze practices. Therefore,
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the system would be produced in smaller quantities and would increase the unit
production cost. But a weapon system production procurement strategy directed
at matching the JDAM and LGB inventory requirements will bring the unit
production cost down. Also, the unquantifiable return on investment for total
system increase in reliability would lower total ownership cost as well. The
following is a rough order of magnitude engineering estimate of the design and
procurement cost of the HiRel Fuzing System. The non-recurring costs are
broken into four areas consisting of development, test, qualification, and software
changes. Development cost is estimated to be $10M based on past experience
for developing and preparing weapon unique fuzes. The test and fuze test
hardware costs are estimated at $3M providing 30 fuzes costing $100K each. The
government qualification cost is estimated at $3M to support free flight drops,
HERO qualification testing, and penetration sled testing. The software changes
for both the aircraft Operational Flight Program (OFP) and weapon OFP are
estimated to cost $8M and $2M respectively. This is based on similar aircraft and
fuze integration costs.

The estimated total development cost is $26M as

summarized in table 2. For procurement costs, the HiRel Fuzing System is
comparable in complexity to existing weapon unique serial interfaced fuzes,
therefore assuming a 90% learning curve, an initial procurement of 10,000 fuzes
would have an average cost of approximately $5.6K per fuze (Clessas, 2005). For
subsequent procurements the average cost should be less than $5K.
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Table 2
Estimated HiRel Fuzing System Non-recurring Costs
Non-recurring Component
Development
Test Fuze Hardware
Qualification Tests
Aircraft OFP Change
Weapon OFP Change
Total

Cost ($M)
10.0
3.0
3.0
8.0
2.0
26.0
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Chapter 4

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
BALANCING RELIABILITY AND SAFETY
This study’s intent was to evaluate the potential use of a more reliable fuze system
for General Purpose (GP) bomb family of weapons. The first question that
needed to be answered was if there is an underlying requirement for increased
reliability with the current inventory of fuzes. Here are some words from Lt Gen
Walter Buchanan the Commander of 9th Air Force speaking about Operations
Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom revealing the expected or implied current
weapons’ reliability requirement of 100% (JDAM Program Office, 2005).
“My concern is that this war has reached a point where a tactical error can
have strategic implications so everything in our arsenal needs to work first
time, every time. We have also become the victim of our own success in that
the ground troops ‘know’ we can shack the target every time and pretty much
control collateral damage. As such, we only drop one at a time so when one
doesn’t work as advertised it becomes obvious.”
The FMU-139 Electro-mechanical Fuze alone has a very high demonstrated
reliability and yet it receives most of the flak when weapons do not function
properly. The incorporation of the ancillary components imposed by safety
requirements produces variability in reliability. Also, these components ultimately
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reduce reliability because of the increase chance of improper assembly and
mechanical failure. The bottom-line is a failure is unknown until the aircrew and
aircraft have been put in harm’s way and see from the cockpit a dust cloud on the
ground where a high order detonation should have been. So, the balancing act of
safety and reliability of the current inventory of fuzes should be addressed
because there is an underlying requirement for increased reliability with the
current inventory of fuzes. There is an expectation that GP bombs with current
fuzes work 100% of the time and unfortunately they are employed with that
mindset. The operational users are setting themselves up for failure because the
current fuzing system does not work 100% of the time.
TECHNICAL RISKS
The second question that needed to be answered to evaluate the potential use of
a more reliable fuzing system was whether increased reliability is feasible. The
proposed concept of the HiRel Fuzing System does not require new technology
development with the MIL-STD-1760 connector because of their use today and
also because the MIL-STD-1553 messages are mature and proven. However, the
risk rests on the experience of existing fuze production contractors, which have
limited experience working with or designing products that interact with these
interfaces. Currently, the fuze to weapon/aircraft interface is assessed to be a
medium risk. There is an ongoing effort to mitigate that risk by incremental
steps. The first effort is called the FMU-139 Product Improvement Program
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(PIP) whereby ESAD technology is evaluated in a FMU-139 type fuze, which will
continue to utilize the ancillary components for power and meeting the safety
requirements. The PIP will also have the addition of serial data interface to
receive fuze data from the weapon.

This first step will be a one way

communication for the fuze to receive arm and detonation delay times. The next
effort will progress to a complete removal of the components leading to the
fuzing system completely interfacing with the weapon/aircraft system.

The

removal of these components has a two-fold effect on increased reliability
because the removal of the components and the steps in the process of building
that system will inherently increase the reliability of the system. Also, a complete
interface will allow for status monitoring and testing of the fuzing system to
report any failures which will subsequently prohibit the employment of a known
failed weapon system. The PIP effort will not be the complete answer, but the
knowledge and experience from the PIP effort will be building blocks for the
HiRel Fuzing System. The differences between mechanical and electrical fuzes
are summarized in table 3 revealing how ESAD technology promotes a more
reliable fuze system.
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Table 3
Comparison of Mechanical and Electrical Fuzing Systems
History
Interface & Control
S&A Description
S&A Type
Explosive Initiator
Explosive Barrier
Stored Energy
Power Consumption
Testability
Manufacturing
High-G Survivability
Long Term Storage

Mechanical Fuze
50+ years
Most use electronics
Electro-mechanical S&A
Primary Mechanical with
some Electronics
Easy to Initiate,
Sensitive EED
Separates EEDs &
explosive
Piston Actuators,
Bellows Motors.
Low
One-shot devices
Special/Hand Assembly
Operations
Harder
Generally gasket tight

Electrical Fuze
5 + Years
All use electronics
Electronic S&A
Electronics & Logic
Hard to Initiate,
Insensitive LEEFI
None Required
None
LEEFI requires more
Facilitates testing over
life cycle
Standard/Highly
Automated
Easier
Can be hermetic

Source: Mr. Wayne Steege, Alliant Techsystems

Another area of reliability that has to be vetted out for the HiRel Fuzing System
is the penetration requirement. Although modern electronics can provide the
required reliability for the weapon’s time of fall, it is uncertain if it can survive the
high shock and vibration levels associated with weapon impact. The survivability
of the fuzing system within a penetrating bomb is assessed to be a medium risk,
but can be mitigated to a low risk. The reduction in size of the components
required for the initiation module of a fuzing system allows that module to be
hardened to survive these environments. Several sled tests during the PIP effort
will reveal the robustness of these components and confirm their survivability.
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The area with the greatest risk is approval of the HiRel Fuzing System design by
the safety community. As stated earlier, the HiRel would not be the first ESAD,
but a complete overhaul of GP bomb fuzing that has been used for the past two
decades will create discomfort. The approval of the HiRel Fuzing System by the
FISTRP is assessed to be a medium risk. There are several things that can help
mitigate this risk. First, the knowledge from other programs that utilize ESAD
technology for their warheads like AIM-9X and JSOW should be sought after to
ensure lessons learned from their approval process can be implemented. Next,
safety reviews should be conducted early in the program because of its
revolutionary nature to minimize safety approval risk. Lastly, safety architecture
that is kept as simple as possible has the greatest ability to gain safety approval.
Every effort should be made to design a simple safety architecture for the HiRel
Fuzing System.
One of the main concerns of the safety community will be the two arming
environments as defined in MIL-STD-1316. The proposed HiRel Fuzing System
design contains some areas that have some technical risks associated with them.
As discussed earlier, one of them is the fuze to weapon/aircraft interface, which
will provide pre-mission fuze data as well as time to go and position information
for the fuze to determine free flight for the second arming environment. The
weapon and aircraft OFP integration effort is assessed to be a medium risk
primarily because this fuzing system is one of many systems trying to integrate
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with the weapon and aircraft. Software verification and validation takes time and
the fuzing system might not be considered a priority, which may lead to a
suboptimum integration schedule. The other area that contains a technical risk
associated with an arming environment is the sensing of the proper weapon
ejection acceleration profile. The sensing of the acceleration profile might be
difficult to assess because of its uniqueness and is assessed to be a medium risk.
The profile must be unique so that the fuzing system will be able to discriminate
the profile from aircraft flight vibration and correlate to a genuine ejection of a
weapon from the rack. Currently, there is an insufficient data set for all GP
bombs’ acceleration profiles from all the different racks and aircraft stations. To
mitigate this risk there is an ongoing effort to characterize weapon rack ejection
acceleration profiles combined with umbilical disconnects to determine
disconnect time relative to the acceleration of the weapon to see the usefulness of
these events for an arming environment. If the acceleration profile is not unique,
it should not be used as a contributor for the safety arming environment.
Through the mitigation efforts addressed above, increased reliability is feasible
with the removal of unreliable components or mechanical elements, the
simplification of buildup of the fuzing system to eliminate or reduce human error,
and the use of an interface between the weapon and the fuzing system to allow
fuze level status reports.
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ENHANCEMENT OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
The third question that needed to be answered for this study to evaluate the
potential use of a more reliable fuzing system was whether a new fuzing system
would enhance mission accomplishment. Any increase in reliability for a fuzing
system is beneficial because all duds are counterproductive. The number one
reason that duds are counterproductive is that the target is not destroyed. If the
target is not destroyed and it is critical enough, then a re-attack is required.
Another reason a dud is bad is if friendly troops are in contact with the enemy,
they will remain in contact because the threat was not destroyed. Also, duds
become Unexpended Ordnance (UXO) on the battlefield requiring EOD to
render the duds safe or remove them before permitting troop movement or,
worse yet, to prevent the enemy acquiring the UXO to use for their purposes as
an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). None of these results is favorable and
therefore an increase in fuzing reliability will enhance mission accomplishment by
reducing sorties for re-attacks, avoiding risks during those re-attacks, ensuring
first strike success, and reducing UXO.
A purely cost savings approach reveals a return on investment for the Precision
Guided Munitions (PGM) saved from duding when an increase in reliability of
just 4%. If the average cost of the perspective PGMs that will use the HiRel
Fuzing System is approximately $30K per unit, then $120K would be saved on
the basis of a fuzing system reliability improvement of 4% for every 100 PGMs
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expended (Riggs, 2005). The cost savings associated with reducing sorties for reattacks, avoiding risks during those re-attacks, ensuring first strike success, and
reducing UXO are all not quantifiable but all would enhance overall mission
accomplishment.
The cause for a weapon failure that results in a dud has been very elusive and
even more so with an early burst because the evidence is destroyed. Engineering
investigations turn to speculation because root causes can not be determined.
The primary reason a weapon is released with a failure is because there is no
failure feedback in the current inventory of fuzes. An all electronic fuze can be
tested throughout its life cycle without being expended unlike its predecessor, the
electro-mechanical fuze. From factory testability to testing after assembly, an
electronic fuze can give feedback that it is connected and functioning properly.
Also, fuzing system tests prior to a mission reveal if a failed weapon exists on an
aircraft to allow the ready spare aircraft to fill-in so as not to jeopardize the strike.
Finally, a fuze self check right before weapon release can prevent a nonfunctioning weapon from being released and leading to the UXO concerns
expressed earlier. Failure feedback from the HiRel Fuzing System will improve
overall mission accomplishment by reducing UXO and IEDs because failures will
be known before dropping ordnance.
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Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the concept of a more reliable fuze
system, the High Reliability (HiRel) Fuzing System, which attempts to achieve a
higher reliability for General Purpose (GP) bomb bodies as utilized in Precision
Guided Munitions (PGMs). The author’s analysis was based on information
attained during a U. S. Navy developmental test program, however all
conclusions and recommendations are independent of the test program. The
author’s role in this program was as chief engineer for U.S. Navy in-service fuze
programs. The study revealed that there is a definite need for increased reliability
with the current inventory of fuzes. Operational users employing Precision
Guided Munitions have the expectation that GP bombs work with a degree of
reliability in excess of the design requirement of the current fuze inventory. As a
result of the precision revolution, a requirement for a highly reliable fuzing
system is realized.
However, any new fuze design must answer the question of how it can ensure it
is at a safe distance from the aircraft before arming and at the same time increase
reliability. The proposed HiRel Fuzing System concept attempts to do that. The
goal of the HiRel Fuzing System is to integrate into a weapon system and
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ultimately provide a higher reliability to the weapon system as a whole. The
proposed concept for the HiRel Fuzing System intends to increase reliability
through several actions. HiRel will provide higher reliability by eliminating points
of failure through the removal of external components that degrade reliability.
Current fuzing performance is dependent on the level of attention given by the
ordnance crew assembling the weapon. The MK-122 Safety Arming Switch,
FZU-48 Bomb Fuze Initiator, cabling, and connections only increase the chances
of failures and any one part’s functionality can not be verified before or after
installation. But because of safety constraints, these components are required for
the determination of arming environments and if they are removed, then a new
design will require the determination of brand new arming environments
acceptable to the safety community.
Also, the HiRel Fuzing System concept minimizes reliability issues associated
with human factors by greatly simplifying buildup through the reduction of the
number of connections significantly. The ordnance crews are not expected to
buildup a JSOW or AIM-9X in the field, because those weapons come as all-uprounds, but the operational forces expect the same reliability as those systems
from the GP bomb fuzing systems. With computers talking to computers, the
HiRel Fuzing System will have simple connections, be able to execute system
checks and report the fuze status to the weapon to prevent a dud from occurring.
The all-electronic fuzing system will also allow factory testability to weed out
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failures in production compared to the electro-mechanical fuze that is analogous
to a mouse trap where the only way to know if it works is to set it off.
Additionally, a fully integrated fuzing system will also receive fuze settings via a
serial data interface eliminating the need for external switches that are unreliable
and that can mistakenly be put in the wrong position. Eliminating the switches in
the HiRel Fuzing System removes one more thing that can fail, which will
increase reliability.
All of these attributes of the HiRel Fuzing System will permit the operational user
to employ the one bomb, one target mindset, but the concept represents a
substantial change from current bomb fuzing, which relies on mechanical
elements and lanyards. The developmental effort requires incremental steps to
evaluate functionality as well as provide confidence to the safety community that
the HiRel Fuzing System is truly safe. The FMU-139 PIP effort will mitigate the
technical and safety risks associated with ESAD technology and integrating a
fuze/weapon/aircraft system paving the way for the HiRel Fuzing System. The
PIP improves reliability inherent in an ESAD but still relies on external
components and there is still the unknown if it will work until it hits the ground.
Since in the mind of the operational user that reliability is measured at the target,
the failure feedback from the HiRel Fuzing System will be the main contributor
to increasing reliability for the system and improving overall mission
accomplishment by nearly eliminating UXOs.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
A fuzing system as an electronic safe and arm device, with status monitoring, and
simplistic buildup would be highly reliable, but there is a lot that needs to be done
before it can become reality. Specific recommendations pertaining to the sensing
of the proper weapon ejection acceleration profile for the determination of the
second arming environment are summarized below:
1. Conduct drop tests with perspective HiRel weapons to characterize
acceleration profiles while incorporating the umbilical connector to define
the time sequence of events.
2. Employ the weapon environmental group to make a comparison of data
from drop tests with an Energy Spectral or Shock Response Spectrum to
reveal if drops are unique enough to be utilized for an arming
environment.
3. Conduct hung store drop tests to characterize acceleration profiles for the
contingency of a hung store and use that profile within the fuzing system
to initiate a dud for safety.
Specific recommendations pertaining to the interface and the integration of the
fuzing system with the weapon/aircraft system are summarized below:

66

1. Proactively coordinate integration efforts with weapon and aircraft
representatives for required hardware and software changes.
2. Determine uniqueness and format of the data for time to go and position
from the weapon mission computer for use with free flight determination
of the second arming environment.
Specific recommendations to gain approval by the safety community of the HiRel
Fuzing System design are summarized below:
1. Research lessons learned about safety approval from other programs that
utilize ESAD technology for their warheads like AIM-9X and JSOW.
2. Conduct safety reviews early in the HiRel program because of its
revolutionary nature to minimize safety approval risk.
3. Keep the safety architecture as simple as possible.
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Appendix A

STRIKE MISSION BRIEF EXAMPLES
DESERT STORM STRIKE MISSION BRIEF EXAMPLE
The following are slides for an example mission brief during Desert Storm.
Approximately 100,000 weapons were delivered by Tactical Aircraft with 93% of
the ordnance being unguided bombs and the other 7% of the weapons were
precision guided (Hole, 2006). The strike composition slide in figure A-1 depicts
an example strike package to prosecute 16 target points with 16 strike aircraft
carrying 128 General Purpose (GP) bombs. Those strike aircraft required 20
support aircraft which provided protection against surface to air missiles and
enemy aircraft, supported with communication links, and utilized jamming to
suppress enemy radars. The formation snapshot in figure A-2 shows the aircraft
in relation to each other and how complicated a strike would be with that many
aircraft. Finally, the aimpoints in figure A-3 reveal the requirement of 16 aircraft
to flow through the target area increasing the risk to aircrew and aircraft on a
strike.
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STRIKE COMPOSITION
(Desert Storm)

CALL SIGN
HAMMER
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
NAIL
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
SWEEP
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
TRON
“
TRON
“
ZAP
“
“
“
SNOOP
RAVEN
DOME
DOME

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
07
17
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
01
02

AIRCRAFT

MISSION

FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
F-14
F-14
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
EA-6B
EA-6B
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
S-3
ES-3
E-2
E-2

ORDNANCE

STK/FTR
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
STK/FTR
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
CL. ESCORT
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
JAM
“
HVAAP
“
HARM
“
“
“
ES
ES
C2
C2

8xMK83
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
1/2/3
“
2/2/2
“
1/2/3
“
“
“
1xAGM88
“
1/2/3
1/2/3
3xAGM88
“
“
“

To prosecute 16 DMPIs
requires:
128 GP weapons
16 Strike Aircraft
20 Support Aircraft
36 Total Aircraft

Figure A-1
Strike Composition for Desert Storm Example
Source: CDR Tom Hole, USN

FORM SNAPSHOT
INGRESS: 510 push to TCP
540 TCP to ECP
18 17 16 15

HMR (18-19K)
4 3 1 2

SWEEP (20-22K)
12 11 13 14

2 nm
5

)
-26K
N (24
TRO 20 21
07

SNOOP 24 (22K)

6

7

22
ZAP (27K)
23
24
25

8

NAIL (18-19K)
4 3 1 2

5

6

7

8

17

RAVEN 25 (23K)

Figure A-2
Formation Snapshot for Desert Storm Example
Source: CDR Tom Hole, USN
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Figure A-3
Aimpoints for Desert Storm Example
Source: CDR Tom Hole, USN

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM
STRIKE MISSION BRIEF EXAMPLE
The following are slides for an example mission brief during Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Approximately 25,000
weapons were delivered by Tactical Aircraft to date with 85% of the ordnance
being precision guided bombs and the other 15% of the weapons were unguided
(Hole, 2006). The strike composition slide in figure A-4 depicts an example strike
package to notional prosecute the same 16 target points with only 4 strike aircraft
carrying 16 Precision Guided Munitions (PGM). The strike aircraft still require
support aircraft with the same roles as described above but less aircraft required.
A formation snapshot would reveal a less complicated evolution with only 15
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STRIKE COMPOSITION
CALL SIGN
HAMMER
“
“
“
SWEEP
“
“
“
TRON
TRON
“
ZAP
“
RAVEN
DOME

01
02
03
04
11
12
13
14
07
20
21
22
23
27
01

AIRCRAFT

MISSION

FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
F-14
F-14
EA-6B
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
FA-18
ES-3
E-2

STK/FTR
“
“
“
CL. ESCORT
“
“
“
JAM
HVAAP
“
HARM
“
ES
C2

ORDNANCE
8xMK82
“
“
“
1/2/3
“
2/2/2
“
1xAGM88
1/2/3
1/2/3
3xAGM88
“

To prosecute 16 DMPIs
requires:
16 PGMs
4 Strike Aircraft
11 Support Aircraft
15 Total Aircraft

Figure A-4
Strike Composition for OEF/OIF Example
Source: CDR Tom Hole, USN

aircraft to orchestrate compared to 36. Finally, the aimpoints in figure A-5 reveal
the requirement of only 4 aircraft to flow through the target area minimizing the
risk to aircrew and aircraft on a strike.
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Figure A-5
Aimpoints for OEF/OIF Example
Source: CDR Tom Hole, USN
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Appendix B

CURRENT WEAPON SYSTEM BUILDUP
The following appendix is an abbreviated checklist from the Airborne Weapons
Assembly Manual, NAVAIR 11-140-10-1, for Laser Guided Bombs.
WEAPON COMPONENT PREPARATION/INSPECTION
MK 80 SERIES BOMB
A. PREPARATION
1. Cut and remove banding material from pallet
2. Remove shipping caps/plugs from nose and tail of bomb
3. Ensure suspension lugs are properly installed
4. Place bomb body on platform stand
B. INSPECTION
1. Nose/tail fuze well threads NOT damaged; well cavity clean and free of
moisture; electrical connector NOT corroded or deformed
2. Ensure electrical connector firmly seated
3. Remove charging receptacle well plug and verify that charging receptacle
diaphragm/connector is NOT corroded or deformed
4. Inspect bomb body for chipped or loose thermal coating
WARNING
Bombs with more than 56 square inches or one area greater than 15 square
inches of thermal coating missing shall not be used afloat.
5. If FZU-48/B is to be used, prepare bomb as follows:
NOTE
The non-destructive method is the preferred method of M70 Series Cable
removal.
a. (Non Destructive) Remove M70 series cable (figure B-1) from charging well as
follows:
(1) Using lock ring tool (figure B-2), remove lock ring from charging well
(2) Using cable knockout (figure B-2), knock fuze plugs out of retaining clips
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(3) Using retaining clip removal tool (figure B-2), remove retaining clips and
discard
(4) Remove and retain M70 series cable
b. (Destructive) Remove M70 Series cable (figure B-1) as follows:
(1) Using lock ring tool (figure B-2), remove lock ring from charging well
(2) Pull charging well plug outward and cut both legs of the cable
(3) Using retaining clip removal tool (figure B-2), remove retaining clips and
fuze plug/cables from fuze cavities
(4) Dispose of all items removed
c. Mark bomb body "FUZE CONTROL CABLE REMOVED"
FMU-139 SERIES FUZE AND COMPONENTS (Figure B-3)
1. Container NOT damaged
2. Remove fuze and closure ring from shipping container
3. Safing pin installed in gag rod/housing; fuze free of moisture/corrosion
WARNING
If safing pin is removed from FMU-139 fuzes and no red and black striping is
visible on gag rod sleeve (sleeve not extended), fuze is safe. If safing pin cannot
be reinserted, notify proper authority for disposition. If red and black striping is
visible on extended gag rod sleeve, fuze may be unsafe. Notify proper authority.
4. Verify red and black striping NOT visible on gag rod sleeve
5. Ensure that LOW DRAG ARM TIME switch is set to the "X" position
6. Remove plastic shipping plug and flag from connector
7. Set fuze switches as required
8. (If Applicable) Prepare FZU-48/B as follows:
a. Remove FZU-48/B and power cable from container
b. FZU-48/B lanyard present and NOT damaged
c. Embossed arrow present; initiator clean and NOT damaged
d. Bottom of FZU-48 properly crimped
e. Remove dust caps from connectors at bottom of FZU-48/B
f. Power cable clean and NOT damaged
WARNING
Power cable assembly P/N 9042203 (identified by white backshell) will be used.
P/N 835308 is no longer authorized and shall be destroyed.
g. Connectors clean and NOT damaged
h. Puller clip present and NOT damaged
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i. Allen head screws and serrated teeth present and NOT damaged
9. (If Applicable) Prepare FZU-61/B as follows:
a. (If Applicable) Remove FZU-61/B from container
b. Pull ring and swaging sleeves present and NOT damaged
c. Cable NOT frayed; Break link NOT damaged
NOTE
If FZU-61 is already attached to FZU-48/B, verify correct length for bomb body
being used. For MK 84 MODS 4/5, the lanyard length should be 27 inches. For
all other bomb bodies, the length should be 24 inches.
MK 122 ARMING SAFETY SWITCH (Figure B-4)
WARNING
Do not pull MK 122 switch lanyard during handling. If the lanyard pin breaks
away from switch, discard entire MK 122 switch so it will not be used on a bomb.
Do not attempt to replace lanyard pin.
1. Remove MK 122 from package; remove rubber shipping cap
2. Inspect coaxial cable for cracks or breaks in the insulation
3. Verify electrical contact is clean
4. Verify magnet wire properly routed and NOT broken
NOTE
Do not install MK 122 until weapons assembly is completed.
WEAPON SPECIFIC COMPONENT PREPARATION/INSPECTION
There are two components that make up a Laser Guided Bomb (LGB) and they
are the Tail Kit and the Computer Control Group (CCG). The preparation and
inspection for the Tail Kit consists of 12 very detailed steps with 1 Warning. The
preparation and inspection for the CCG consists of 17 very detailed steps with 1
warning, 3 Cautions, and 1 Note.
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WEAPON ASSEMBLY
FMU-139 ELECTRONIC FUZE INSTALLATION FOR USE WITH
FZU-48/B (Figure B-5)
A. Fuze Installation
NOTE
If Dual Fuzing is used, repeat steps 1 through 7 for nose fuze. Both fuzes must
be set to the same settings.
1. Back off setscrew in bomb nose fuze well
2. Place O-ring on retainer bolt; install retainer bolt and tighten to 600 + 50 footpounds of torque; tighten bomb nose fuze well setscrew to 150 + 20 inch-pounds
of torque
CAUTION
Torque value shall not be exceeded; breakage of screws is highly possible.
3. Ensure fuze settings as follows:
NOTE
The low drag arm time rotary switch is positioned at the “X” position for all
FFCS use. However, when FMU-139 is utilized with the FZU-48/B vice the MK
122 Safety Switch, the low drag rotary switch must be set at other than “X”
position. If the low drag rotary switch is set to the “X” position when FZU48/B is utilized the weapon will dud.
a. Set LOW DRAG ARM TIME switch as directed
b. Set HIGH DRAG ARM/DELAY switch as directed
4. Attach cable connector to fuze and lock into place
WARNING
When installing or removing power cable on FMU-139 fuze, do NOT use pliers
or any other tools on the shell. The use of tools could damage internal parts and
cause fuzing malfunction.
5. Thread a standard piece of arming wire through bomb conduit from arming
well until it appears at fuze well
6. Attach puller clip of fuze power cable to arming wire and pull power cable
through conduit beyond arming well; tape power cable to bomb body and
remove arming wire

80

NOTE
When nose fuze is used, the fuze retainer nut from the guidance kit is used to
secure the fuze vice the fuze closure ring.
7. Insert fuze into fuze well; secure fuze into fuze well with closure ring/fuze
retainer nut
CAUTION
If closure ring wrench is not available, use spanner wrench and exercise care to
prevent damage to closure ring and fuze.
8. Remove fuze power cable(s) taped to bomb body; remove puller clip(s) from
power cable(s); with initiators embossed arrow pointing forward, connect power
cable(s) to appropriate connector(s) of initiators
CAUTION
Do not twist cable connector during installation on removal from FZU.
9. With embossed arrow pointing forward, insert initiator into charging well and
evenly tighten two Allen head screws on top cover until initiator is secure
10. (Nose Fuze) Remove safety pin from fuze; install fuze seal nut into retainer
bolt and tighten against the fuze retainer nut. Tighten fuze seal nut setscrew
11. (If applicable) Install FZU-61/B firing lanyard as follows:
a. Cut existing FZU-48/B lanyard off just above the lower swaging sleeve
b. If bomb body is to be used is a MK 84 MOD 4/5, cut off short leg of FZU61/B. For all other bomb bodies cut off long leg of FZU-61/B
c. Install FZU-61/B onto FZU-48/B and tape bomb body
B. Post Installation Inspection
NOTE
Since the nose fuze cannot be seen, steps 1 through 4 apply to tail fuze only.
1. Safing pin installed in gag rod/housing
2. Closure ring tight in fuze well
3. Fuze SAFE; red and black NOT visible on gag rod sleeve
4. Fuze switches set as required
5. Inspect FZU-48/B as follows:
a. Embossed arrow points to nose of weapon
b. Air intake NOT open and NOT blocked by upper aerosurface
c. Lanyard present and NOT damaged
d. Properly installed and secure
6. If applicable, FZU-61/B properly installed and NOT damaged
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FMU-139 ELECTRONIC FUZE INSTALLATION FOR USE WITH
MK 122 SAFETY SWITCH (Figure B-6)
A. Fuze Installation
NOTE
If dual fuzing is to be used, both fuzes must be set to the same fuze settings.
1. Safety pin installed gag rod
WARNING
If safing pin is removed from FMU-139 fuzes and no red and black striping is
visible on gag rod sleeve (sleeve not extended), fuze is safe. If safing pin cannot
be reinserted, notify proper authority for disposition. If red and black striping is
visible on extended gag rod sleeve, fuze may be unsafe. Notify proper authority.
2. (Tail Fuze) Insert fuze; install threaded closure ring; tighten with closure ring
wrench
CAUTION
If closure ring wrench is not available, use spanner wrench and exercise care to
prevent damage to closure ring and fuze.
NOTE
When nose fuze is used, the fuze retainer nut from the guidance kit is used to
secure the fuze vice the fuze closure ring.
3. If dual fuzing is to be used, proceed as follows:
a. Back off setscrew in bomb nose fuze well
b. Place O-ring on retainer bolt; install retainer bolt and tighten to 600 ±50 footpounds of torque; tighten bomb nose fuze well setscrew to 150 ±20 in-pounds of
torque
CAUTION
Torque value shall not be exceeded; breakage of screws is highly possible.
c. Install fuze into nose fuze well
d. Screw fuze retainer nut into retainer bolt and tighten against the fuze. Remove
fuze safety pin from nose fuze
e. Install fuze seal nut into retainer bolt and tighten against the fuze retainer nut.
Tighten fuze seal nut set screw
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B. Post Installation Inspection
NOTE
Since the nose fuze cannot be seen, the following steps apply to tail fuze only.
1. Safing pin installed in gag rod/housing
2. Closure ring tight in fuze well
3. Fuze SAFE; red and black NOT visible on gag rod sleeve
4. Fuze switches set as required
MK 122 ARMING SAFETY SWITCH INSTALLATION (Figure B-6)
WARNING
Do not pull MK 122 switch lanyard during handling. If the lanyard pin breaks
away from switch, discard entire MK 122 switch so it will not be used on a bomb.
Do not attempt to replace lanyard pin.
CAUTIONS
Do not pry tools or any other objects between the coaxial cable and the lanyard
pin hold to the orientation of the safety switch while tightening the retaining nut.
Doing so may damage the safety switch causing the bomb to dud.
Take special care to prevent damage to coaxial cable and lanyard of MK 122
arming safety switch during bomb moving and loading operations.
A. MK 122 Installation
1. Plug male connector of switching unit into bomb body charging receptacle,
piercing the diaphragm
2. Slide switching unit retaining nut, threads down, over cable and lanyard
3. Screw retaining nut into bomb body, tighten with spanner wrench provided,
ensuring coaxial cable is aft of lanyard pin
4. Insert free end of cable through bomb suspension lug; tape cable and lanyard
to weapon
B. Post Assembly Inspection
1. Magnet wire NOT broken
2. Coaxial cable aft of lanyard pin
3. Cable and lanyard taped to weapon
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Figure B-1
M70 Series Cable Removal
Source: Airborne Weapons Assembly Manual

Figure B-2
Cable Removal Tools
Source: Airborne Weapons Assembly Manual

84

Figure B-3
FMU-139 Series Fuze and Component Preparation/Inspection
Source: Airborne Weapons Assembly Manual

Figure B-4
MK 122 Arming Safety Switch Inspection
Source: Airborne Weapons Assembly Manual
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Figure B-5
FMU-139 Fuze Installation/Removal with FZU-48/B Initiator
Source: Airborne Weapons Assembly Manual

Figure B-6
MK 122 Arming Safety Switch Installation/Removal
Source: Airborne Weapons Assembly Manual
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